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Protecting the Border, One Passenger 
Interrogation at a Time 
INTRODUCTION 
The terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001, represented the ultimate intersection between criminal 
and immigration law. Because many of the terrorists had 
entered the United States legally with visas issued by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),1 the tragedy 
revealed the deficiencies in the administration of laws that 
provided for entry into the United States.2 Thus, in the years 
following September 11, immigration policy has been 
transformed3 to ensure that persons who have not been 
properly screened and verified are not allowed to remain in the 
country.4 That transformation has included a greater 
criminalization of immigration violations5 as “illegal immigrants 
have come to be seen as synonymous with terrorists.”6 The new 
priorities of immigration agencies and authorities have become 
to restrict admission and increase deportations with the 
purported goal of rooting out terrorists and increasing the 
security of the nation.7    
 1 See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 
ENTRY OF THE 9/11 HIJACKERS INTO THE UNITED STATES, STAFF STATEMENT NO. 1, at 4 
(2004) [hereinafter STAFF STATEMENT NO. 1], available at http://www.9-
11commission.gov/staff_statements/staff_statement_1.pdf (“Beginning in 1997, the 19 
hijackers submitted 24 applications and received 23 visas.”); see also NAT’L COMM’N ON 
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 218, 226 (2004) 
[hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ 
911/report/911Report.pdf. 
 2 See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 80-82.  
 3 See STAFF STATEMENT NO. 1, supra note 1, at 3 (“Our immigration system 
before 9/11 focused primarily on keeping individuals intending to immigrate from 
improperly entering the United States.”); see also Nora V. Demleitner, Misguided 
Prevention: The War on Terror as a War on Immigrant Offenders and Immigration 
Violators, 40 CRIM. L. BULL., no. 6, at 5 (2004) (noting that in mid-2001, fighting 
terrorism was not INS’s main concern). 
 4 See generally Demleitner, supra note 3.  
 5 Id. at 2.  
 6 JULIE FARNAM, US IMMIGRATION LAWS UNDER THE THREAT OF TERRORISM 
18 (2005). 
 7 Demleitner, supra note 3, at 1. “Because of the focus on foreign terrorism, 
immigration law has become a major investigatory and enforcement tool on the 
frontline in the fight against terrorism.” Id. 
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Charged with fighting terrorism and increasing 
homeland security, immigration agencies and officials have 
seen their power strengthened and expanded. For years, 
immigration agents have been routinely boarding domestic 
trains and buses traveling within one hundred miles of the 
border and interrogating passengers about their citizenship 
status and requesting their immigration paperwork.8 Agents 
have arrested and detained thousands of passengers that did 
not have their immigration paperwork.9 Individuals who were 
detained were sent either to detention facilities or local prisons 
and county jails, and most were held there until they were able 
to post a bond.10 
This purportedly legal practice—the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) allows immigration officials to 
interrogate anyone they suspect of being an illegal alien11—
actually goes far beyond what Congress intended. Congress 
gave officials the authority to interrogate individuals in this 
way at the border, or close to the border, because of the greater 
need to investigate entrants into the United States.12 Instead, 
immigration officials have been using the authority of the INA 
to question and arrest passengers on domestic vessels that 
have not crossed a border and will not be crossing a border.13 
Further, the explanation of fighting terrorism and arresting 
recently entered illegal immigrants cannot be justified by this 
practice, as “the vast majority of those arrested . . . had been in 
  
 8 Nina Bernstein, Border Sweeps in North Reach Miles into U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/30/ 
nyregion/30border.html; Karen Branch-Brioso, Border Patrol Checks Bus Boarders, 
TAMPA TRIB. (May 4, 2008), http://www2.tbo.com/content/2008/may/04/040011/na-
border-patrol-checks-bus-boarders-bus-riders-hi/; see also Kirk Semple, Report Faults 
Border Patrol on Bus and Train Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2011, at A27, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/09/nyregion/border-patrol-searches-faulted-in-new-
report.html?_r=1.  
 9 Bernstein, supra note 8; N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FAMILIES FOR 
FREEDOM & NYU SCH. OF LAW IMMIGRANT RTS. CLINIC, JUSTICE DERAILED: WHAT 
RAIDS ON NEW YORK’S TRAINS AND BUSES REVEAL ABOUT BORDER PATROL’S INTERIOR 
ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES 1, 4 (2011) [hereinafter NYCLU REPORT], available at 
http://www.nyclu.org/publications/report-justice-derailed-what-raids-trains-and-buses-
reveal-about-border-patrols-interi. “[N]early all individuals arrested during 
transportation raids are detained by CBP without being screened for risk of flight, 
threat to the community, or other considerations . . . regardless of whether they are 
recent entrants apprehended at the border or have resided in the United States for 
years.” Id. at 14. 
 10 NYCLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 14-15. 
 11 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (2006). 
 12 See infra Part II.A (discussing the “border-search exception,” which allows 
officials greater leeway in investigating individuals when they arrive from outside the 
U.S. specifically because they are coming from outside the country). 
 13 Bernstein, supra note 8. 
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the country for more than one year,” and many had been in the 
country for more than three years.14  
Immigration officials violate the Fourth Amendment 
when they interrogate random passengers in this way. In the 
seminal Fourth Amendment case Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme 
Court laid out the parameters of police officers’ authority.15 The 
Court specifically stated that a seizure occurs when a police 
officer “restrains” an individual’s ability to “walk away.”16 An 
officer who has seized an individual must have reasonable 
suspicion to justify the intrusion.17 The practice at issue here is 
a coercive display of police authority that constitutes a seizure, 
because the passengers do not feel free to refuse to respond.18 
Under Terry and the Court’s subsequent cases further defining 
a “seizure,”19 immigration officers must have reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause to carry out their investigations.  
This practice directly results from the post-September 
11 expansion in immigration officials’ powers, which gives 
agents unprecedented authority under the official purpose of 
fighting terrorism.20 However, the post-September 11 policies 
have resulted in almost no arrests for the actual crime of 
terrorism.21 On the other hand, the lives of individuals who 
have been in the United States for years have been 
unjustifiably disturbed; in many instances, the consequences 
for individuals questioned during these transportation checks 
are dire, since the INA permits mandatory detention for 
  
 14 NYCLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 8-9; see also Bernstein, supra note 8. 
 15 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 16 See id. at 16.  
 17 See id. at 20-21.  
 18 See infra Part III.A; see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 
552 (1980) (“Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has 
in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has 
occurred.”). 
 19 See infra Part III.A. 
 20 See infra Part I. 
 21 DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 232-34 
(3d ed. 2006) (The authors note that “the war on terrorism, at least at home, has netted 
almost no actual terrorists.” Specifically, the authors write that although “[t]he Justice 
Department boasts that its terrorism investigations have led to more than 300 criminal 
indictments [and] over 100 convictions,” the vast majority of those convictions have been 
“for minor charges, not terrorism.” Further, “few of the government’s indictments charge 
actual terrorism.”); see also Demleitner, supra note 3, at 1 (“[S]o far these special measures 
have yielded few tangible results.”); CONSTITUTION PROJECT, THE USE AND ABUSE OF 
IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY AS A COUNTERTERRORISM TOOL: CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS 1 (2008), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/ 
Immigration_Authority_As_A_Counterterrorism_Tool.pdf (“As the bipartisan 9/11 
Commission’s staff found, there is no evidence that the post-September 11 immigration 
initiatives targeted at Arabs and Muslims succeeded in identifying any actual terrorists.”). 
1560 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:4 
individuals with questionable status22 and possibly immediate 
deportation without judicial review.23 These actions are 
troubling because the courts,24 the INA,25 and the current 
administration recognize that some immigrants, even those in 
the country illegally, deserve certain protections. Recently, the 
Obama administration has stated that it will focus on 
deporting convicted criminals and individuals who pose 
national security risks rather than illegal immigrants with no 
criminal records.26 Additionally, Senator Richard J. Durbin has 
sponsored legislation called the Development, Relief, and 
Education for Alien Minors Act of 2010 (the DREAM Act) that 
would provide a path to citizenship for certain young illegal 
immigrants who came to the United States as children.27 Thus, 
the Obama administration and even members of Congress have 
recognized that although individuals may be in the country 
illegally, their ties to the United States may afford them 
greater protection from intrusion and seizure than first-time 
entrants or suspected terrorists.  
  
 22 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (2006). 
 23 See U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT 2007, at 
58 (2007), available at http://www.uscirf.gov/images/AR_2007/annualreport2007.pdf.  
 24 Historically, the Supreme Court has recognized that individuals who have 
resided in the United States for some time are entitled to more procedural protections 
than first-time entrants. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“[O]nce an alien 
gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent 
residence his constitutional status changes accordingly.”); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 
U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903) (holding that an illegal alien, who “has become subject in all 
respects to” the jurisdiction of the United States and has become “a part of its 
population,” is entitled to some due process protections). 
 25 The INA’s cancellation of removal procedures are arguably a recognition by 
Congress that individuals who have lived in the U.S. for many years and have 
established ties to the country may, in certain instances, gain permanent resident 
status and repose. Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. 
 26 Julia Preston, U.S. to Review Cases Seeking Deportations, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
17, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/us/deportation-cases-of-
illegal-immigrants-to-be-reviewed.html?_r=1&hp. In particular, this would indefinitely 
delay the deportation of individuals who entered the country illegally as children (and 
thus did not make the original choice to immigrate) and have since spent their lives in 
the United States Robert Pear, Fewer Youths to Be Deported in New Policy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 18, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/19/us/ 
19immig.html?pagewanted=all. For one immigrant’s personal account of coming to the 
United States as a child and living with no legal status, see Jose Antonio Vargas, My Life 
as an Undocumented Immigrant, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2011, (Magazine), at MM22, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/26/magazine/my-life-as-an-
undocumented-immigrant.html?_r=1&src=ISMR_HP_LO_MST_FB. 
 27 David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Blocks Bill for Young Illegal Immigrants, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/politics/ 
19immig.html?sq=DREAM%20act&st=cse&adxnnl=1&scp=1&adxnnlx=1293375627-
zGDKC/ZXQgn3ztzRZoOO5g. The Senate voted down the bill, in a vote by 55-41 in 
favor of the bill. Id. 
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In November 2011, three immigrant rights groups—the 
New York Civil Liberties Union, Families for Freedom, and the 
Immigrant Rights Clinic at New York University School of 
Law—released a report examining data of arrests that occurred 
during these “transportation raids” in upstate New York.28 The 
report found that these document checks “do little to protect 
the border, but they threaten constitutional protections that 
apply to citizens and non-citizens alike.”29 In particular, the 
authors concluded that the majority of those arrested and 
detained were not recent border-crossers, agents violated 
“established arrest procedures,” and anecdotal reports 
indicated that officers used racial profiling to pick out the 
individuals stopped and questioned.30 The report advocated 
ending this practice and putting in place more constitutional 
and procedural protections.31 
In fact, the Border Patrol has taken some action to scale 
back the amount of random transportation checks that occur. 
In October 2011, the agency ordered field offices that were not 
near the southwest border to conduct checks in train and bus 
stations and airports only when “they have specific ‘actionable 
intelligence’ that there is an illegal immigrant there who 
recently entered the country.”32 However, this order “has not 
been made public,” and, as stated by a spokesman for the U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection, “does not amount to a change 
in policy.”33 Additionally, Border Patrol Agents and their union, 
the National Border Patrol Council, have criticized the move.34 
The union stated that the reduction in the number of 
transportation checks has “handcuff[ed] the effectiveness of 
Border Patrol agents.”35 The union also alluded ominously to 
the September 11 attacks and stated, “A decade ago nineteen 
illegal aliens overstayed visas . . . which resulted in nearly 
3,000 Americans losing their lives. This lesson must be lost on 
  
 28 NYCLU REPORT, supra note 9. 
 29 Id. at 1. 
 30 Id. at 2. 
 31 Id. at 25. 
 32 U.S. Relaxes Canadian Border Checks as Agents Are Told to Stop 
Searching Buses, Trains and Planes for Illegal Immigrants, MAIL ONLINE (Oct. 30, 
2011, 2:25 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2055204/US-relaxes-
Canadian-border-checks-Routine-bus-train-plane-searches-stopped.html.  
 33 Id. 
 34 Id.; Press Release, Nat’l Border Patrol Council, Border Patrol Curtails 
Transportation Checks with Increased Bureaucracy (Oct. 27, 2011) [hereinafter NBPC 
Press Release], available at http://www.nbpc.net/index.php?option=com_content& 
task=view&id=367&Itemid=1. 
 35 NBPC Press Release, supra note 34. 
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those running the Border Patrol in Washington.”36 Thus, 
although there has been a shift away from using transportation 
checks on domestic bus and train routes, no formal or official 
order has ended the practice, and there has been backlash.  
As evident from the National Border Patrol Council’s 
statement, illegal immigrants are still closely associated with 
terrorists, and until there is permanent action to curb the 
practice of transportation checks, they may continue to be used 
at any time. Therefore, Congress and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), the agency responsible for border 
security and the training of Border Patrol agents, must take 
official action to curtail this practice. Congress should amend 
the INA to permit Border Patrol agents to question individuals 
only when they have reasonable, particularized suspicion that 
the passenger is either in the country illegally or may be a 
terrorist, and the DHS should provide ongoing training to its 
agents on administering this standard. 
This note will analyze the Border Patrol’s interrogation 
of passengers on domestic vessels under the Fourth 
Amendment and border search jurisprudence, and it will argue 
that the practice is unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment. Therefore, this practice must be curtailed. Part I 
will discuss the structure of immigration authority and 
immigration law in the United States, including the changes in 
that structure after the September 11 attacks. Part II will 
discuss the law that defines the parameters of searches at the 
border and analyze whether this practice is illegal under that 
framework. Part III will discuss the general search and seizure 
law after Terry and argue that random requests for 
immigration documents of passengers on domestic vessels is 
both unconstitutional and based on unsound policy. Part IV 
will propose an amendment to the INA to curb this practice 
and a refinement of DHS training policy that would permit 
officers to question passengers only when they have 
individualized, reasonable suspicion to believe that the 
passenger is either an illegal alien or a terrorist.  
Although protecting the nation from terrorism is an 
imperative objective, the Border Patrol’s interrogation of 
domestic passengers does nothing to further that goal. On the 
other hand, this practice violates passengers’ personal liberties 
in contravention of the Fourth Amendment. Because it is 
  
 36 Id. 
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unconstitutional and ineffective, Congress and the DHS should 
limit Border Patrol agents’ authority. 
I. CHANGES IN IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY AS A 
RESPONSE TO TERRORISM 
Even before the attacks on September 11, Congress 
made changes to immigration law to deter and penalize illegal 
immigration.37 After September 11, however, the connection 
between immigration and terrorism became explicit and 
Congress acted to strengthen the police powers of immigration 
officials by increasing funds, personnel,38 and the jurisdiction in 
which they could interrogate and detain individuals suspected 
of being illegal immigrants.39 The changes in immigration law 
and policy after September 11 have led to the current policy of 
randomly stopping, interrogating, and detaining passengers on 
common carriers travelling on routes exclusively within the 
United States. 
A. Immigration Law Prior to September 11, 2001 
Before the massive changes wrought by the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, immigration officials were responsible 
for regulating “travel, entry, and immigration” into the United 
States.40 Congress charged the INS, the primary agency 
overseeing immigration, principally with preventing individuals 
from entering the country illegally41 and working in the United 
States without authorization.42 Although the INS had a staff of 
about “9,000 Border patrol agents, 4,500 inspectors, and 2,000 
immigration special agents,”43 the job function of these 
individuals was not framed in the context of national security.44 
Instead, the INS had responsibility for the “controlled entry” of 
temporary visitors and the administration of programs that 
allowed non-citizens to become naturalized or to gain 
  
 37 See infra Part I.A. 
 38 See infra Part I.B. 
 39 See infra Part I.C. 
 40 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 383-84. 
 41 Marian L. Smith, Overview of INS History, in A HISTORICAL GUIDE TO THE 
U.S. GOVERNMENT 305, 308 (George T. Kurian ed., 1998).  
 42 Id. (The INS was charged with investigating and sanctioning corporate 
employers who hired illegal immigrants, as well as the deportation of those illegal 
immigrants); Donald Kerwin & Margaret D. Stock, The Role of Immigration in a 
Coordinated National Security Policy, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 383, 386 (2007). 
 43 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 80. 
 44 Id. at 383-84. 
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permanent resident status.45 The INS’s main enforcement 
function was to detect and remove aliens who had entered the 
country illegally or stayed past the expiration of their legal 
documents.46 Therefore, searching for terrorists was not the 
priority of the INS or its employees.47 
The powers of the INS were defined by the INA.48 Since 
its enactment in 1952, Congress has amended the INA 
numerous times.49 The history of the INA—specifically the 
amendments enacted in the last twenty years—demonstrates 
the role that the ideals of fighting terrorism and national 
security have played in transforming immigration law to 
expand the power of immigration officials to find and remove 
certain individuals. 
For instance, in 1996, following the 1993 bombing of the 
World Trade Center and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, 
Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (AEDPA).50 A reaction to the threat of terrorism,51 
the AEDPA broadened the law under which individuals could 
be denied entry based on their suspected connections to 
terrorism. Previously, the government had the burden of 
proving that the individual denied entry or facing deportation 
had “personally engaged” in terrorist activity.52 Under the new 
Act, admissibility would be denied to any individual who was 
  
 45 Smith, supra note 41, at 308. 
 46 Id. An “alien” is “any person not a citizen or national of the United States.” 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006). A “nonimmigrant” is “[a]n alien who seeks temporary 
entry to the United States for a specific purpose.” Definition of Terms, DEP’T 
HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/ 
stdfdef.shtm#0. This note will use the word “alien” interchangeably with “noncitizen.” 
See COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, AM. BAR ASSOC., REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 
1-6 n.10 (2010) [hereinafter ABA REPORT], available at http://new.abanet.org/ 
Immigration/PublicDocuments/aba_complete_full_report.pdf.  
 47 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 81. 
 48 See REGINA GERMAIN, AILA’S ASYLUM PRIMER 24 (6th ed. 2010). 
 49 See Smith, supra note 41, at 305-08 (summarizing enactment of 
immigration legislation from the late 1800s to the present); Public Laws Amending the 
INA, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/ 
menuitem.f6da51a2342135be7e9d7a10e0dc91a0/?vgnextoid=fa7e539dc4bed010VgnVC
M1000000ecd190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=fa7e539dc4bed010VgnVCM1000000ecd190a
RCRD&CH=publaw (last visited Jan. 24, 2012). 
 50 FARNAM, supra note 6, at 22-23.  
 51 Perhaps foreshadowing the legislative response to the September 11 
attacks, AEDPA was enacted primarily in the shadow of the Oklahoma City Bombing. 
COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 21, at 132. Immediately following the attack, “Members 
of Congress . . . felt tremendous pressure to pass antiterrorism legislation. It did not 
matter that the proposals in the president’s initial bill were directed largely against 
international terrorism, while the Oklahoma bombing was the work of homegrown 
criminals.” Id. 
 52 Id. at 143. 
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found to be “a representative” or a “member” of a terrorist 
organization.53 Thus, the new law took away the requirement of 
individual responsibility and instead denied entry to 
individuals based merely on their suspected associations with 
terrorist groups.54  
Following the passage of the AEDPA, Congress passed 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)55 to more forcefully address the problem of 
illegal immigration into the United States,56 which was linked 
to terrorism. “IIRIRA was a major overhaul of the entire INA”57 
that “drastically changed the landscape of immigration law.”58 
The IIRIRA made significant changes to immigration 
enforcement both at the borders and in the country’s interior. 
In particular, the Act authorized the Attorney General to 
  
 53 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, § 411, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV-V)). 
 54 COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 21, at 143 (arguing that AEDPA substituted 
the requirement of a “personal connection to terrorist activity” for “guilt by 
association,” which is otherwise prohibited by the First Amendment). 
 55 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in 
scattered provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1101) [hereinafter IIRIRA]. 
 56 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-879, at 95 (1997). In its report on the history of the 
enactment of the IIRIRA, the Judiciary Committee characterized the state of illegal 
immigration, at the time, as such: 
[M]ore than 4 million illegal aliens resided in the United States at the start of 
the 104th Congress, with an average net increase each year of 300,000; 
approximately half of these illegal residents had arrived with legal temporary 
visas and had overstayed; each year, tens of thousands of illegal aliens were 
ordered deported but were not removed from the United States due to lack of 
resources and legal loopholes; and the legal immigration system failed to 
unite nuclear families promptly, encouraged the “chain migration” of 
extended families, and admitted the vast majority of immigrants without 
regard to their level of education, job skills, or language preparedness. 
Id. The Committee further noted that the immigration laws prior to the IIRIRA,  
[C]ontributed to the problems we now face by failing to set clear priorities for 
our immigration system, and failing to provide tough sanctions against those 
who violate our immigration laws. In addition, these laws failed to treat 
migration as a comprehensive phenomenon, and failed to make the tough 
choices on priorities that would restore credibility both to our systems of 
admitting legal immigrants and deterring, apprehending, and removing 
illegal immigrants. More fundamentally, the law failed to provide adequate 
resources and enforcement tools to the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) to carry out its critical functions. 
Id.  
 57 Scott Aldworth, Note, Terror Firma: The Unyielding Terrorism Bar in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1159, 1167 (2010). 
 58 FARNAM, supra note 6, at 30. 
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substantially increase the number of border patrol agents,59 
install additional physical barriers and roads in the vicinity of 
the U.S. border, and buy any additional equipment necessary 
to stop illegal immigration.60 Further, the IIRIRA included 
changes to the procedures for inspecting, detaining, and 
removing aliens.61 For example, the Act established “expedited 
removal,” under which an individual in certain circumstances 
could be deported without judicial review,62 and mandated the 
detention of individuals facing expedited removal.63  
Thus, even before September 11, Congress responded to 
the fear of terrorism by targeting illegal immigration—it 
expanded the money and resources given to the INS, broadened 
the definition of which individuals could be deported and 
denied entry, and removed judicial review for deportation 
proceedings in certain cases. After September 11, the perceived 
tie between immigration and terrorism became even stronger, 
and Congress and the President responded accordingly. 
B. Immigration Law after September 11, 2001  
In 2005, “The 9/11 Commission Report” was released to 
the public.64 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
  
 59 IIRIRA § 101(a). Specifically, IIRIRA states that “[t]he Attorney General in 
each of fiscal years 1997 . . . [–] 2001 shall increase by not less than 1,000 the number 
of positions for full-time, active-duty border patrol agents within the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service.” Id.  
 60 Id. § 102(a).  
 61 Id. tit. III.; see also FARNAM, supra note 6, at 30-31 
(“IIRIRA . . . implement[ed] changes in border control, document fraud dealings, 
admissibility procedures, removal processes, asylum and refugee law, with implications 
for international students, and visas and consular procedures in general. This law is 
perhaps the biggest overhaul of the U.S.’s immigration system since the INA . . . .”). 
 62 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006); see Ebba Gebisa, Comment, Constitutional 
Concerns with the Enforcement and Expansion of Expedited Removal, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 565, 565-66; see also FARNAM, supra note 6, at 36 (“Much of the controversy 
surrounding IIRIRA had to do with its expanded grounds for removal.”); Ayelet Shachar, 
The Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 809, 816-19 (2009); 
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Policy and Politics of Immigrant Rights, 16 TEMP. POL. 
& CIV. RTS. L. REV. 387, 389-93 (2007). 
 63 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). The mandatory detention provision of the 
IIRIRA has proven to be one of its most controversial aspects. See generally Nancy 
Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited 
Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000); see also Lenni B. Benson, 
As Old as the Hills: Detention and Immigration, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
11, 12 (2010) (“We use immigration law and detention as a weapon in the law’s 
enforcement because we seek to control our border. . . . [O]ur ‘border control’ is person 
control and containment.”). 
 64 Eric Lichtblau, 9/11 Report Cites Many Warnings About Hijackings, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/10/politics/10terror.html? 
pagewanted=1&_r=1.  
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upon the United States (the Commission), which had been 
created by Congress and the President to investigate the 
attacks,65 was highly critical of the INS.66 The Commission found 
that in the 1990s, the INS was “seriously hampered by outdated 
technology and insufficient human resources.”67 As a result, the 
Commission concluded, the INS could barely handle its actual 
primary functions, much less be prepared to fight terrorism.68  
In fact, before September 11, there was no U.S. 
government agency whose primary responsibility was 
analyzing the travel of foreign nationals to determine any 
potential terrorist threat.69 The Commission found this 
particularly troubling and noted, “For terrorists, travel 
documents are as important as weapons.”70 In his testimony 
before the House Committee on the Judiciary shortly after the 
attacks, Attorney General John Ashcroft emphasized this point 
and stated, “The ability of alien terrorists to move freely across 
our borders and operate within the United States is critical to 
their capacity to inflict damage on our citizens and facilities.”71 
His statement made clear that immigration law would soon 
become a tool for detecting criminal terrorist activity.72 
The Commission proposed the establishment of a new 
agency—the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—to 
address the deficiencies in the U.S. immigration system that 
September 11 made painfully clear.73 The new department 
would be a consolidation of the multitude of government 
agencies that had previously been tasked, separately, with 
homeland security and immigration oversight.74 The hope was 
  
 65 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at XV.   
 66 See id. at 383-84. The Commission pointedly noted that, “[T]he routine 
operations of our immigration laws—that is, aspects of those laws not specifically 
aimed at protecting against terrorism—inevitably shaped al Qaeda’s planning and 
opportunities.” Id. at 384.  
 67 Id. at 80. 
 68 Id. at 384. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 John D. Ashcroft, A Clear and Present Danger, in RIGHTS VS. PUBLIC 
SAFETY AFTER 9/11, at 3, 7 (Amitai Etzioni & Jason H. Marsh eds., 2003). 
 72 See id. at 4. Ashcroft stated that a goal of the DOJ would be to increase the 
authority of the INS, as part of broader changes in “law enforcement.” He thus placed 
the changes to immigration policy within the larger context of improving criminal law 
enforcement. See id. at 4-7.  
 73 See generally EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY (2002) [hereinafter DHS PROPOSAL], available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/book.pdf. 
 74 ELIZABETH C. BORJA, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. HISTORY OFFICE, BRIEF 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 3 (2008) 
[hereinafter DHS BRIEF HISTORY], available at www.hsdl.org/?view&did=37027 
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that one department “that has no question about either its 
mission or its authority,”75 along with one “comprehensive 
national strategy” for fighting terrorism, would be better able to 
secure the nation.76 
Thus, in November of 2002, President George W. Bush 
signed into law the Homeland Security Act of 2002,77 which 
established the DHS and directed that the Secretary of 
Homeland Security would run the department.78 Unlike the 
INS, the DHS had the primary purpose of fighting terrorism.79 
The U.S. Government manual states that the DHS “leads the 
unified national effort to secure America. It will prevent and 
deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to 
threats and hazards to the Nation. The Department will ensure 
safe and secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants and 
visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce.”80 By its own 
mandate, the goal of the country’s main immigration authority 
is to fight terrorism first and to welcome immigrants second.81  
The DHS was created to unify the various immigration 
and homeland security functions that had previously been 
spread across different agencies.82 Thus, the immigration 
departments of the DHS each have a specific function that 
combines immigration and law enforcement. These departments 
include the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS), which establishes and administers immigration and 
  
(“Before the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, homeland 
security activities were spread across more than 40 federal agencies and an estimated 
2,000 separate Congressional appropriations accounts.”). 
 75 DHS PROPOSAL, supra note 73, at 5. 
 76 DHS BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 74, at 4. 
 77 Id. at 7. 
 78 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 101-02, 116 Stat. 
2135 (codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 111-12 (2012)).  
 79 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL 228 (2009-10), 
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/gmanual/browse-gm-09.html; FARNAM, supra 
note 6, at 53 (“Since 9/11 . . . the priority of the United States government and the 
agencies that control immigration in this country . . . is protection.”).  
 80 U.S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL, supra note 79, at 226. 
 81 In the section defining the mission of DHS, the Homeland Security Act of 
2002 lists first and foremost that “[t]he primary mission of the Department is 
to . . . prevent terrorist attacks within the United States.” Pub. L. No. 107-296, 
§ 101(b)(1); see also ABA REPORT, supra note 46, at 1-5 (“DHS serves both an 
enforcement function . . . and a service function . . . .”). 
 82 DHS BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 74, at 3. For a list of the agencies that 
became part of DHS, see History: Who Became Part of the Department?, DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_0133.shtm (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2012).  
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naturalization policy;83 the United States Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), which is responsible for securing the 
borders;84 and the United States Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), which enforces immigration laws in the 
country’s interior.85 Specifically, the CBP conducts inspections 
of arriving people and goods at ports of entries and is charged 
with “deterrence or apprehension of illegal immigrations 
between ports of entry.”86 Further, the Border Patrol is 
responsible for securing both the country’s international land 
borders with Canada and Mexico, as well as the United States’s 
coastal borders.87 The ICE, on the other hand, is charged with 
conducting investigations in the country’s interior, as well as with 
the detention and removal of noncitizens.88 The three agencies 
work together to conduct the removal proceedings for noncitizens: 
the CBP and the ICE initially determine which individuals should 
be subject to removal proceedings, while the USCIS conducts the 
proceedings to determine whether these individuals should be 
granted legal status to remain in the United States.89  
Additionally, after the September 11 attacks, Congress 
significantly increased the number of personnel and funds 
available to immigration authorities in every state along the 
northern border.90 In the Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Congress 
appropriated “such sums as may be necessary” to triple the 
number of Border Patrol personnel, Customs Service personnel, 
and INS inspectors.91 Further, the PATRIOT Act appropriates 
an additional $50,000,000 to both the INS and the U.S. 
  
 83 “USCIS is responsible for immigration benefit services . . . .” ABA REPORT, 
supra note 46, at 1-8. However, like the other DHS organizations, it is still tasked 
primarily with security enforcement. Id. at 1-8 n.35. 
 84 FARNAM, supra note 6, at 50.  
 85 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL 
REPORT: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2008, at 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement_ar_08.pdf.  
 86 Id. (emphasis added). 
 87 Id. According to DHS, CBP secures over 9000 miles of land, including 
“approximately 7,000 miles of international land border with Canada and Mexico and 
2,000 miles of coastal border.” Id. 
 88 ABA REPORT, supra note 46, at 1-9.  
 89 Id.  
 90 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 401-
02, 115 Stat. 272, 342-43 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 
15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C., 50 U.S.C.).  
 91 Id. § 402(1)-(3). 
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Customs Service to improve and acquire any technology and 
equipment necessary to monitor the northern border.92  
Since its creation in 2003,93 the CBP has grown into a 
major government operation. It currently employs more than 
20,000 Border Patrol agents and has officers at more than 330 
ports of entry.94 Further, the agency received $10.1 billion in 
funding for fiscal year 2010.95 More than $2 billion has been 
appropriated to border security, including personnel, 
infrastructure, and technology.96 These figures indicate that as 
the perceived link between immigration and terrorism has 
grown, Congress and the President have increased funds, 
personnel, and support to the DHS. That support has directly led 
to the expanded use of random document checks of passengers 
traveling domestically on public transportation.  
C. Internal Document Checks 
Policing immigration has become one of the government’s 
primary methods for fighting terrorism and providing national 
security.97 Border Patrol agents have broad statutory authority 
to conduct investigations of individuals they suspect to be in 
violation of immigration laws. Currently, under the INA, 
immigration officials do not need a warrant to “interrogate any 
alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to 
remain in the United States,”98 arrest any alien they see 
illegally entering the United States or who they believe is in 
the country illegally and “is likely to escape before a warrant 
  
 92 Id. § 402(4). 
 93 Timeline, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, http://nemo.cbp.gov/opa/ 
timeLine_04212011.swf (last visited Jan. 24, 2012). 
 94 Securing America’s Borders: CBP Fiscal Year 2010 in Review Fact Sheet, 
CBP.GOV (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/cbp_ 
overview/fy2010_factsheet.xml.  
 95 COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FACT 
SHEET: FY 2010 SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS: BORDER SECURITY, available at 
http://democrats.appropriations.house.gov/images/stories/pdf/dhs/Appropriations_Fact_
Sheet_-_Border_Security_Supplemental.pdf. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric 
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 509 (2007) 
(“Perhaps no single development better exemplifies the public association of 
immigration and terrorism than the transfer of immigration functions to a Department 
whose defining mission is counter-terrorism.”); Demleitner, supra note 3, at 9-12 
(“[I]mmigration-related activities have been prosecuted as criminal violations but 
justified as anti-terrorism measures. . . . It was 9/11 that made immigration . . . a 
national security issue.”).  
 98 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (2006). 
2012] PROTECTING THE BORDER 1571 
can be obtained for his arrest,”99 and “to board and search for 
aliens any vessel . . . and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, 
or vehicle” within a reasonable distance of a U.S. border.100 
Beyond the border or its “functional equivalent,” however, 
immigration officials must have at least reasonable suspicion 
to warrant an inquiry or a search.101 Nonetheless, following the 
general expansion of authority after the September 11 attacks, 
CBP agents have utilized this statutory grant of power to 
conduct random interrogations of passengers traveling 
domestically within the United States—that is, not at the 
border or its functional equivalent.102 
CBP agents conduct inspections by boarding domestic 
trains, buses, and ferries traveling along domestic routes 
(meaning the vessels never cross the border) and inquiring 
about passengers’ immigration status.103 At any given time, at 
least six uniformed officers, all armed, may board the vessel 
and—with no preface and no outright indication that the 
passenger may refuse to give their consent—ask passengers 
whether they are U.S. citizens.104 As one journalist observed, 
passengers “startled from sleep, simply stared, and the agents 
prompted them: ‘State your citizenship for me, please, sir. 
What country were you born in?’”105 Border Patrol agents 
request the immigration documents of any passengers who are 
not U.S. citizens.106 Passengers without their documents are 
removed from the train and detained for further investigation 
and questioning, in full view of the other passengers.107 
Though this practice is not widely publicized,108 it is 
actually quite large in scope. In August 2010, Nina Bernstein of 
  
 99 Id. § 1357(a)(2). 
 100 Id. § 1357(a)(3). See infra Part II.A (discussing how the INS has defined 
“reasonable distance”). 
 101 See infra Part II.A (discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of this 
statute as it applies to roving patrols at the border and beyond). 
 102 See infra Part II.B (arguing that the area where transportation checks 
occur does not fall under the definition of the “functional equivalent” of the border). 
 103 Bernstein, supra note 8; Emily Bazar, Some Travelers Criticize Border 
Patrol Inspection Methods, USA TODAY (Oct. 2, 2008, 1:08 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-09-30-border-patrol-inside_N.htm; Branch-
Brioso, supra note 8.  
 104 Nina Bernstein, When the Border Patrol Comes Aboard, N.Y. TIMES CITY 
ROOM BLOG (Aug. 30, 2010, 10:04 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/30/ 
when-the-border-patrol-comes-aboard [hereinafter Bernstein II].  
 105 Id.; see also NYCLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 7. 
 106 Bernstein, supra note 8.  
 107 Bernstein II, supra note 104. 
 108 NYCLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 7; see also Bernstein, supra note 8 
(noting that “[d]omestic transportation checks are not mentioned in a report on” CBP’s 
“northern border strategy”). 
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the New York Times reported that each year, as a result of 
these transportation checks, hundreds of passengers on trains 
and buses traveling along the northern border are taken to 
detention—and placed in removal proceedings—because they 
do not have “satisfactory immigration papers” with them.109 
Bernstein further suggested that such stops account for about 
3000 arrests based on immigration violations each year.110 In 
2008, in a similar report regarding transportation checks on 
domestic trains, buses, and ferries, USA Today reported that 
transportation checks in CBP’s Buffalo sector resulted in the 
arrest of 1786 illegal immigrants.111 In the agency’s New Orleans 
sector, 1754 illegal aliens were arrested on bus checks.112  
These internal transportation checks have been “fueled 
by . . . an expanding definition of border jurisdiction”113 and 
justified primarily as a security measure to prevent 
terrorism.114 Further, immigration officials argue such checks 
are necessary on transportation near the border, because 
illegal immigrants would flee deeper into the interior after 
entering.115 The problem with this argument, however, is that 
CBP agents are boarding domestic carriers that have not 
crossed the border. The vast majority of those arrested and 
detained had resided in the United States for years—some had 
overstayed their visa status, were in the process of changing 
their status, or had actually been granted legal status 
already.116 Nancy Morawetz, a leading immigration scholar who 
  
 109 Bernstein, supra note 8. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Emily Bazar, Border Patrol Expands Transportation Checks, USA TODAY 
(Oct. 1, 2008, 12:35 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-09-30-border-
patrol-checks_N.htm. The Buffalo sector covers about 400 miles of border. Id.  
 112 Id. The New Orleans sector covers seven states. Id. 
 113 Bernstein, supra note 8; see also Shachar, supra note 62, at 811-19 
(arguing that expedited removal is an example of how the definition of the “border” is 
changing—becoming “malleable and movable”—and “blurring the line between the 
perimeter and the interior”). 
 114 “‘Our mission is to defend the homeland, primarily against terrorists and 
terrorist weapons,’” said the immigration official in charge of the Border Patrol station 
in Rochester, NY, where 1040 people were arrested in 2008, “95% of them from buses 
and trains.” Bernstein, supra note 8. 
 115 A supervisory agent in Washington, D.C. explained CBP’s policy by stating 
that, “If you have someone attempting to illegally enter the United States, it’s very 
unlikely that they’re going to stay 15 yards from the international border . . . . We want 
to take a layered approach.” Bazar, supra note 103 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Similarly, an immigration official in Washington State argued that, “The first line of 
defense is on the immediate border . . . . We have to have a second line of defense.” 
Bazar, supra note 111 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 116 NYCLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 6-11. The report further states that “Less 
than 1 percent of those arrested had entered the United States within the last 72 hours.” Id. 
at 10; see also Nadja Drost, Heighted Security at U.S.-Canada Border Catching Few Terror 
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supervises the NYU Immigrant Rights Clinic and is one of the 
authors of the NYCLU report, argues that while the expansion 
of the CBP’s authority was meant to deal with “border 
security,” it has actually become “interior enforcement to sweep 
up farmworkers and students.”117  
Such document checks have questionable utility for fighting 
terrorism as well. As a CBP public affairs officer stated, “If you look 
at our apprehensions, a small percentage have anything to do with 
terrorism . . . .”118 Ninety percent of the CBP’s prosecutions in 2008 
were for immigration—not criminal—violations.119 Thus, the 
government cannot justify transportation checks on domestic 
carriers either on the ground of detecting terrorism or finding 
illegal immigrants attempting to flee the border.  
II. SEARCHES OF INDIVIDUALS AT THE BORDER 
Immigration officials have the power to conduct 
searches and seizures at the border through a long-standing 
exception to the Fourth Amendment known as the “border-
search exception.”120 Under this doctrine, officials may search 
anyone crossing the border or its “functional equivalent” 
without a warrant, and in some cases without reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause, for the sole reason that those 
individuals have entered the country from elsewhere.121 The 
Supreme Court has held that interrogations conducted by 
immigration officials beyond the border or its “functional 
equivalent” are subject to normal Fourth Amendment 
requirements: they must be supported by reasonable suspicion 
or probable cause, since the reasons for the “border-search 
exception” no longer apply.122 In the INA, Congress granted 
much broader discretion to immigration officials to stop and 
inquire about individuals’ immigration status.123 However, as 
the Supreme Court noted in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 
  
Suspects, IMMIGR. WATCH CAN. (Apr. 19, 2009), http://www.immigrationwatchcanada.org/ 
2009/04/19/heightened-security-at-u-s-canada-border-catching-few-terror-suspects/ (“[A] 
Border Patrol agent in upstate New York who did not want his name used due to concern he 
could lose his job said most of the immigrants he apprehends haven’t come over the border 
recently—they are traveling domestically and have lived here for years in many cases.”).  
 117 Bernstein, supra note 8.  
 118 Drost, supra note 116.  
 119 Id. 
 120 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619-20 (1977).  
 121 See United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853, 858-59 (5th Cir. 1987); see also 
infra Part II.A.  
 122 See infra Part II.A. 
 123 See infra Part II.A. 
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a case that addresses immigration officials’ investigative power 
under the INA, “[N]o Act of Congress can authorize a violation 
of the Constitution.”124 
A. The INA and Exceptions to the Fourth Amendment at 
the Border  
Since the First Act of Congress, legislators and the 
Supreme Court have granted broad leeway to officers searching 
people, cars, or objects that have just entered the country.125 In 
1789, Congress stated that nothing beyond “suspicion” was 
necessary to examine items crossing the border.126 This leeway 
has been termed the “border-search exception” to the Fourth 
Amendment bar against “unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”127 As the Supreme Court explained while officially 
upholding the exception in United States v. Ramsey, a border 
search is “reasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment for “the single fact that the person or item in 
question had entered into our country from outside.”128 Thus, an 
individual entering the country from outside should expect to be 
searched and should therefore have a lesser expectation of 
privacy.129 Further, vehicles may be searched without a warrant 
when they cross “an international boundary because of national 
self-protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to 
  
 124 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973). 
 125 Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789) (“[I]t shall be lawful for 
the . . . officer of the customs, after entry made of any goods, wares or merchandise, on 
suspicion of fraud, to open and examine . . . any package or packages thereof . . . [I]f 
any of the packages so examined be found to differ in their contents from the entry, and 
it shall appear that such difference hath been made with intention to defraud the 
revenue, then all the goods, wares or merchandise contained in such package or 
packages, shall be forfeited . . . .”).  
 126 Id. 
 127 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619-20 (1977).  
 128 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619. 
 129 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539 (1985) 
(citations omitted) (“[T]he expectation of privacy [is] less at the border than in the 
interior . . . .”); see also Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 (The Court affirmed that there is no 
warrant requirement for a border search because “a port of entry is not a traveler’s 
home. . . . Customs officials characteristically inspect luggage and their power to do so 
is not questioned . . . ; it is an old practice and is intimately associated with excluding 
illegal articles from the country.” (quoting United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 
402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted))); United States v. 
Espericueta-Reyes, 631 F.2d 616, 622 (1980) (noting that “[t]he power to detain persons 
at the border while their possessions are searched derives from the nation’s right to 
regulate who and what may enter the Country”); Border Searches and the Fourth 
Amendment, 77 YALE L.J. 1007, 1012 (1968) (explaining that one of the justifications 
for the border search exception is that because “the individual crossing a border is on 
notice that certain types of searches are likely to be made, his privacy is arguably less 
invaded by those searches”).  
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identify himself as entitled to come in.”130 Probable cause (much 
less a warrant) is therefore not a requirement for a search 
conducted at the border.131  
Searches that occur at the “functional equivalent” of the 
border also fall under the border-search exception.132 The 
functional equivalent of the border is an area where most 
individuals have just crossed the border so the justifications for 
the exception still apply.133 The functional equivalent could 
include, for example, “an established station near the border, at 
a point marking the confluence of two or more roads that extend 
from the border,” or an airplane arriving in the United States on 
a nonstop flight from Mexico.134 The exception to the Fourth 
Amendment applies at the “functional equivalent” of the border 
for the same reason as it applies at the border: for the “single 
fact” that an individual has entered the country from outside.135 
Additionally, at a traffic checkpoint located reasonably 
close to the border, police officers may conduct a “stop[] and 
questioning” without reasonable, individualized suspicion or 
probable cause.136 Although this is looser than typical Fourth 
Amendment requirements, the rule is again based on the 
closeness of the search to the border; in upholding it, the 
Supreme Court argued that the government interest in 
preventing illegal aliens from using highways to quickly get 
away from the border outweighed the private interest in 
privacy.137 Further, the Court reasoned that defendants have a 
decreased expectation of privacy at a traffic checkpoint as 
compared to their homes,138 and government agents subject 
them to less fright or annoyance than when a roving patrol 
stops them, because the government agents ask individuals 
only a few questions, and they can see that other vehicles are 
also getting stopped and questioned.139  
When searches are conducted beyond the border, 
however, the Supreme Court has held that more information is 
needed to stop, question, and search individuals. Officers in 
roving patrols beyond the border or its functional equivalent 
  
 130 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925). 
 131 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619. 
 132 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973). 
 133 See United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960, 965 (1974). 
 134 Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273. 
 135 United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853, 858 (5th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). 
 136 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562 (1976). 
 137 See id. at 556-57. 
 138 Id. at 558-62 (citations omitted). 
 139 Id. at 557-58 (citations omitted). 
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can only stop and question vehicles when they have “specific 
articulable facts . . . that reasonably warrant suspicion that the 
vehicle[] contain[s] [illegal] aliens.”140 Further, police officers in 
roving patrols or checkpoints beyond the border or its 
functional equivalent may not search a vehicle without 
probable cause or consent.141  
The INA, however, does not have these same 
requirements of reasonable suspicion or probable cause. It 
eliminates the warrant requirement and authorizes immigration 
officials to “interrogate” anyone believed to be an alien about his 
or her immigration status.142 Additionally, “within a reasonable 
distance from” a United States border, officials may board and 
search “any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle” for 
illegal immigrants.143 The INS had further defined reasonable 
distance as “within 100 air miles from any external boundary 
of the United States.”144 Despite this language, the Supreme 
Court has held that when immigration officials conduct 
searches beyond the border or its functional equivalent, the 
investigation must be supported by reasonable suspicion, 
probable cause, or consent.145  
For example, when a roving patrol stopped and 
questioned passengers in a car “on a California road that lies at 
all points at least 20 miles north of the Mexican border,” the 
Court held that this stop was of a “wholly different sort” than 
an investigation that occurs at the border or its functional 
equivalent.146 Even though the government was backed by the 
  
 140 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975). Reviewing 
courts, in determining whether there was reasonable suspicion, look at the “totality of 
the circumstances” of each case. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) 
(citations omitted). Under this analysis, courts look at whether the officer had a 
“‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing,” id., taking into 
account the officer’s experience and training, including an immigration official’s 
experience with particular routes used by illegal aliens and the official’s “experience as 
a border patrol agent.” See id. at 277 (citations omitted).  
  Further, an individual’s Mexican ancestry alone does not provide such 
facts and is therefore an illegal reason to stop and question an individual, although 
Mexican appearance is a “relevant factor.” Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886-87.  
 141 See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896-97 (1975) (holding that, because 
of the significant invasion of privacy in searching private cars, “at traffic checkpoints 
removed from the border and its functional equivalents, officers may not search private 
vehicles without consent or probable cause”); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881-82; 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 267-68, 274-75 (1973) (holding that a 
warrantless search conducted by roving patrol on a road that never intersects the 
Mexican border, with no probable cause justification, violates the Fourth Amendment). 
 142 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (2006). 
 143 Id. § 1357(a)(3). 
 144 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2) (2010). 
 145 See Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272-73; Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884.  
 146 Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273. 
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INA, the Court stated, specifically in response to their use of 
the statute, “[N]o Act of Congress can authorize a violation of 
the Constitution.”147 The Court held the search of passengers in 
a vehicle that never intersected the border unconstitutional 
without probable cause, even though the INA, on its face, 
authorized the stop.148 Similarly, transportation checks 
conducted on domestic common carriers are unconstitutional 
because the vessels never cross the border and are therefore 
not subject to the “border-search exception.”  
B. Domestic Document Checks Do Not Fall Under the 
Border-Search Exception 
Like the Supreme Court, Congress and the DHS have 
argued that certain measures, inapplicable in the country’s 
interior, are necessary at the border. In passing the expedited 
removal and mandatory detention provisions of the IIRIRA, the 
House Judiciary Committee argued, “If not detained, the aliens 
would most often disappear and become long-term illegal 
residents.”149 Further, in explaining the expansion of the 
expedited removal program, the DHS stated that its focus was 
on “unlawful entries that have a close spatial and temporal 
nexus to the border”—meaning that this expanded authority is 
necessary, “because many aliens will arrive in vehicles that 
speedily depart the border area, and because other recent 
arrivals will find their way to near-border locales seeking 
transportation to other locations within the interior of the 
U.S.”150 These policies arose because of the belief that more 
stringent requirements are necessary at the border to prevent 
aliens who have just entered from fleeing. The government’s 
explanation of its actions reflects an understanding that there 
is something different about individuals who have just entered 
the country from outside. 
The government has justified the document checks on 
public transportation on similar grounds.151 However, the 
justification is incongruent with the actual practice. The 
passengers are questioned while traveling on trains and buses 
  
 147 Id. at 272. 
 148 Id. at 272-73. 
 149 H.R. REP. NO. 104-879, at 98 (1997).  
 150 Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877, 48,879 
(Aug. 11, 2004). 
 151 See supra Part I.C. 
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that have only domestic routes.152 Though they are traveling 
within one hundred miles of the border, they have not recently 
crossed the border. Moreover, they are not at the “functional 
equivalent” of the border, because they have not entered the 
country from outside—and there is no reason to suspect that 
they have, since a train or bus traveling domestically never 
intersects with another country. When the Court gave 
examples of what may constitute the “functional equivalent” of 
the border, it provided areas where the majority of the 
individuals have recently entered the country from 
elsewhere.153 Thus, the individuals stopped during the 
transportation checks should have the same expectation of 
privacy as any individual in the interior of the United States. 
Moreover, the argument that these vessels may contain illegal 
aliens attempting to flee into the country’s interior is weak, 
again, because these vehicles have not come from across the 
border.  
III. POLICE QUESTIONING OF INDIVIDUALS 
The random questioning has also been justified by the 
general Fourth Amendment principle that a police officer may 
approach an individual in a public place and ask that person 
questions—without any requirement of a warrant, probable 
cause, or reasonable suspicion—as long as “a reasonable person 
would understand that he or she could refuse to cooperate.”154 
The encounter becomes a “seizure” that implicates the Fourth 
Amendment if the individual questioned believes that he or she 
is not free to walk away.155 The conduct of immigration officials 
on domestic carriers is coercive and therefore a “seizure” under 
the Fourth Amendment. As long as CBP agents continue their 
interrogations without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, 
they are conducting illegal seizures in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
  
 152 See Bernstein, supra note 8. 
 153 See Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273. 
 154 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991); see also INS v. Delgado, 466 
U.S. 210, 215 (1984) (citations omitted).  
 155 Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (stating 
that “whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk 
away, he has ‘seized’ that person”).  
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A. Defining a “Seizure” 
As the Supreme Court noted in Florida v. Royer,156 no 
“litmus-paper test” determines whether a consensual encounter 
or a seizure has occurred.157 Instead, courts look at the totality 
of the circumstances and decide whether, based on all the 
circumstances, a “reasonable person would have believed he 
was not free to leave.”158 This is not a question of the subjective 
experience of the individual, but of the objective factors and 
what a reasonable person would have concluded from them.159 
If the encounter was “so intimidating,”160 or the officer “by 
means of physical force or show of authority”161 has indicated 
that the individual is not free to leave, then a “seizure” has 
occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.162  
Courts have looked at a variety of factors in determining 
whether a “seizure” has occurred. In United States v. 
Mendenhall, the Supreme Court articulated several specific 
factors that may indicate officers’ behavior is coercive and 
constitutes a seizure.163 These factors include “the threatening 
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an 
officer . . . or the use of language or tone of voice indicating 
that” an individual’s compliance is required.164 Further, the 
Court has held that “[t]he cramped confines of a bus are one 
relevant factor that” could be used to determine whether the 
individual being questioned felt that he was free to leave.165  
If, in fact, a seizure has occurred, the officers must have 
“reasonable, articulable suspicion” to justify it166—even if the 
  
 156 460 U.S. 491 (1983). 
 157 Royer, 460 U.S. at 506-07; see also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) 
(noting that the Court has “consistently eschewed bright-line rules” in determining 
whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, “instead emphasizing 
the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry”). 
 158 Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216; see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
544, 554 (1980). 
 159 See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 228 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 160 Id. at 216 (majority opinion). 
 161 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). 
 162 See id.; accord Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (“As long as the person to 
whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there 
has been no intrusion upon that person’s liberty or privacy as would under the 
Constitution require some particularized and objective justification.”). 
 163 446 U.S. 544 (1980). 
 164 Id. at 554. 
 165 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (The Court noted, however, the 
fact that the questioning took place on a bus, by itself, is not dispositive.); see also 
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 204 (2002). 
 166 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983). In his concurrence to Royer, 
Justice Brennan argued that any time a uniformed police officer approaches an 
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seizure at issue is “only a brief detention.”167 This reasonable 
suspicion standard requires the officer to show specific facts, 
“which, taken together with rational inferences,” would 
“reasonably warrant” the seizure.168 Further, even if the officer 
has specific facts to justify the seizure, the officer’s conduct is 
still limited in scope: the officer’s actions must be “reasonably 
related in scope to the justification” for the seizure.169 With 
these rules, the Court has tried to limit police intrusion into 
individual privacy in an effort to balance important 
government interests with the individual interests in privacy 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.170  
In a few illustrative cases, the Court has applied this 
totality of the circumstances test to determine whether a 
“seizure” had occurred, with varying results that indicate 
changes in policy rather than a consistent application of the 
Court’s own principles. For example, in INS v. Delgado,171 INS 
agents entered a workplace to look for illegal aliens.172 Agents 
were positioned near all of the building’s exits and others 
moved throughout the factory asking employees questions.173 If 
employees answered “unsatifactor[ily]” or stated that they were 
aliens, the agents asked for their immigration documents.174 
The Court held that in this situation, a seizure had not occurred; 
even though agents were stationed at all the exits, the 
  
individual and requests to see his documents (in this case, the defendant’s airplane 
ticket), a seizure has occurred, because “[i]t is simply wrong to suggest that a traveler 
feels free to walk away when he has been approached by individuals who have 
identified themselves as police officers and asked for, and received, his airline ticket 
and driver’s license.” Id. at 512 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 167 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 551 (citations omitted); see also INS v. Delgado, 
466 U.S. 210, 227 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects 
an individual’s personal security and privacy from unreasonable interference by the 
police, even when that interference amounts to no more than a brief stop and 
questioning concerning one’s identity.”). 
 168 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see also Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 551. 
 169 Terry, 392 U.S. at 29. For example, in Terry, the Supreme Court upheld 
the inclusion at trial of a gun that a police officer obtained by frisking the defendant on 
the street. The Court held that the personal intrusion was permissible because the 
officer’s justification for conducting the search—his and bystanders’ protection—was 
limited in scope to a search aimed at discovering instruments that could be used to 
assault an officer. Id. at 29-30. 
 170 See id. at 20-21 (“In order to assess the reasonableness of [the police 
officer’s] conduct as a general proposition, it is necessary first to focus upon the 
governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the 
constitutionally protected interest of the private citizen, for there is no ready test for 
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] 
against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.” (citations omitted)). 
 171 466 U.S. 210 (1984). 
 172 Id. at 212. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. at 212-13. 
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employees could have “simply refused to answer.”175 The agents 
were only questioning the employees; this conduct “could hardly 
result in a reasonable fear that [employees] were not free to 
continue working or to move about the factory.”176 Further, while 
employees may have believed they would be questioned if they 
tried to leave the building, they should not have reasonably 
believed “they would be seized or detained in any meaningful 
way” for doing so.177 Therefore, looking at the totality of the 
circumstances, the Court concluded that at all times, a 
reasonable employee—in a building where INS agents were 
walking around and standing near all the exits—should have 
felt free to walk away or refuse to answer, and thus, a seizure 
had not occurred.178 No reasonable, individualized suspicion 
was required to question the individual employees here.179 
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, argued instead that, 
based on all the objective factors, a seizure had in fact occurred 
because “a reasonable person could not help but feel compelled 
to stop and provide answers to the INS agents’ questions.”180 
Contrary to the majority’s description, the encounter from the 
viewpoint of the employees was an intimidating show of 
authority that required individualized suspicion.181 The 
inspection was a surprise one, carried out by fifteen to twenty-
five agents “who moved systematically through the rows of 
workers” while showing their badges and asking questions.182 
Employees suspected of being illegal aliens were handcuffed and 
led away to vans waiting outside, while agents stationed at the 
exits could prevent others from escaping questioning.183 Under 
these “tactics,” the employees could not possibly have felt they 
could refuse to answer the questions and leave.184 The agents 
  
 175 Id. at 218. The fact that the inspection occurred at a workplace was also a 
factor in the Court’s decision: Justice Rehnquist argued that, at work, individuals have 
an obligation to their employers to remain at work—therefore, their freedom of 
movement is already somewhat restricted. See id. Additionally, Justice Powell in 
concurrence argued that an employee’s “expectation of privacy in the plant 
setting . . . certainly is far less than the traditional expectation of privacy in one’s 
residence.” See id. at 224 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 176 Id. at 220-21 (majority opinion). 
 177 Id. at 219. 
 178 Id. at 212, 220-21.  
 179 See id. at 221. 
 180 Id. at 229 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 181 Id. at 229-30. 
 182 Id. at 230. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. at 230-31. 
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therefore needed to have reasonable and particularized suspicion 
to question each individual.185 
Finally, Justice Brennan articulated an important 
distinction for purposes of immigration law—the difference 
between a legal and an illegal alien.186 He argued that “the 
mere fact that a person is believed to be an alien provides no 
immediate grounds for suspecting any illegal activity.”187 In the 
context of a large-scale inspection like the one at issue, “it is 
virtually impossible to distinguish fairly between citizens and 
aliens,” and therefore, the INS needed particularized, 
reasonable factors to question individuals suspected of being in 
the country illegally, rather than just to question anyone who 
may be an alien.188 
As hinted at by the dissent, the INS v. Delgado decision 
was motivated by the strong public interest in curbing illegal 
immigration.189 The show of force was so strong that it is not 
reconcilable with the Court’s previously articulated factors in 
Mendenhall; no reasonable employee in the situation could 
have felt free to refuse the agents’ questions or to leave the 
building when officers entered and essentially blocked the 
exits. Thus, the public policy interest weighed more strongly 
than the individual interest in privacy. While such a balancing 
of factors is standard in the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
cases,190 it also has a ratcheting effect in that the Court 
describes more police encounters as “consensual” rather than 
“seizures”—even if the individual feels they have been detained—
as long as the policy interest is strong enough to justify them. 
  
 185 Id. at 232-34. Here, there was no individualized suspicion to question 
anyone—the INS agents were instructed to interrogate “virtually all persons” in the 
factory. Id. at 233. In response, Justice Brennan argued, “To say that such an 
indiscriminate policy of mass interrogation is constitutional makes a mockery of the 
words of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 234. 
 186 Id. at 235. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. at 235-36. 
 189 See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, La Migra in the Mirror: 
Immigration Enforcement and Racial Profiling on the Texas Border, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 167, 176-77 n.40 (2009) (“Since a person might not feel free to leave 
when the only avenue for leaving a location is blocked by law enforcement officials, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Delgado that individuals caught in the midst of a workplace 
inspection by immigration officials were not seized for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment suggests that the only distinguishing criterion is that the Delgado incident 
occurred in the immigration context rather than the traditional criminal law context.”). 
 190 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). In Terry, the particular interest at 
issue was the necessity of the police officer to ensure that the individual he was 
questioning was not dangerous to himself or the surrounding public. Id. at 23. 
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Cases where individuals were stopped during drug 
searches illustrate the ratcheting effect. In Florida v. Bostick,191 
police officers conducting a drug search on a bus questioned the 
defendant without any articulable suspicion and then searched 
his belongings with his consent.192 The defendant argued that 
in the “cramped confines” of the bus, where police officers 
essentially blocked the exits and displayed their badges and 
firearms, he did not feel free to refuse consent either to the 
questioning or the search of his belongings.193 The Court held 
that the mere fact that the encounter took place on a bus did 
not constitute a seizure per se.194  
This practice was again upheld in United States v. 
Drayton,195 where the Court held that police officers conducting 
a drug search on a bus are not required to inform passengers of 
their right to refuse cooperation.196 In Drayton, because the police 
officers did not “brandish” the weapons they were clearly carrying 
or “make any intimidating movements,” a reasonable passenger 
would have felt free not to cooperate with the police.197 In 
particular, the Court held that because the public knows most law 
enforcement officers are armed, “[t]he presence of a holstered 
firearm thus is unlikely to contribute to the coerciveness of the 
encounter absent active brandishing of the weapon.”198 
As the dissent pointed out in Bostick, the practice at 
issue in these cases occurred within the broader context of the 
“War on Drugs.”199 By placing the decision within this 
framework, Justice Marshall hinted that the public policy was 
an important factor in the majority’s decision and argued that 
based on the mere facts alone, a seizure had in fact occurred.200 
The dissent asserted that the practice was “intimidating” and 
coercive,201 and the presence of the officers was “threatening.”202 
When armed and uniformed police officers question passengers 
  
 191 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
 192 Id. at 431-32 (The defendant was carrying cocaine in his luggage and was 
therefore arrested.).  
 193 Id. at 435. 
 194 Id. at 438-39. The case was remanded to the lower court for a 
determination of whether the conduct of the officers in this particular case, based on all 
the factors (not just that the encounter occurred on a bus), “communicated to a 
reasonable person that” he was free not to consent. Id. at 439-40. 
 195 536 U.S. 194 (2002). 
 196 Id. at 206-07. 
 197 Id. at 203-04. 
 198 Id. at 205. 
 199 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 440-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 200 See id. at 440. 
 201 Id. at 446-47. 
 202 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 210 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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on a bus, effectively blocking the exit, they create “an 
atmosphere of obligatory participation” in which a reasonable 
person would not feel free to refuse cooperation.203 The dissent 
argued that such a seizure requires reasonable suspicion; 
without that, such bus sweeps “violate[] the core values of the 
Fourth Amendment.”204 Based on the public interest in finding 
illegal drugs, the Court in these cases found that a seizure had 
not occurred—despite factors that, objectively, appeared to be 
exactly those that did require reasonable suspicion in the 
Court’s prior opinions. 
B. Internal Document Checks on Domestic Vessels Are an 
Illegal Seizure 
The internal document checks violate the “core values” 
of the Fourth Amendment, because they are conducted without 
any reasonable or particularized suspicion.205 In Terry, the 
Supreme Court asserted that a seizure occurs when a police 
officer, “by means of physical force or show of authority,”206 has 
restrained an individual’s freedom to “walk away.”207 Under the 
factors articulated in Mendenhall,208 immigration officials 
inspecting individual passengers on domestic train and bus routes 
display a coercive amount of power and thus, their actions 
constitute a seizure. This practice must include reasonable, 
particularized suspicion, and it must be limited in scope. 
The factors here amount to a coercive practice, where 
ordinary individuals do not feel free to refuse to answer.209 Fully 
uniformed and armed immigration officials board trains and 
buses and ask passengers at random whether they are U.S. 
citizens.210 In full view of other passengers, they check 
  
 203 Id. at 212. 
 204 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 440 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 205 See id. 
 206 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (emphasis added). 
 207 Id. at 16.  
 208 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (citations omitted); 
see supra Part II.B. 
 209 In researching this issue for the New York Times, journalist Nina 
Bernstein specifically tested whether she could refuse. See Bernstein II, supra note 
104. When asked whether she was a citizen, she replied, “I don’t want to answer that 
question.” Id. The officers moved on. Id. Bernstein, however, was fully aware of the law 
which allows individuals to refuse consent, and, as she herself pointed out, was “a 
white woman in jeans who had spoken American English with no accent.” Id. She had 
no further evidence of other individuals refusing consent, because they all answered 
the officers’ questions. Id. 
 210 Id. (“[H]alf a dozen men in green uniforms with pistols on their hips strode 
down the platform . . . .”). 
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individuals’ immigration documents and passports211 and remove 
from the train for further questioning those that do not have 
their papers.212 Several immigration officers essentially block the 
exits, by standing between the passenger and the doors.213 
Moreover, as the dissent pointed out in Bostick, “Because the 
bus is only temporarily stationed at a point short of its 
destination, the passengers are in no position to leave as a 
means of evading the officers’ questioning.”214 The officers also 
create an “intimidating atmosphere,” by walking among 
passengers and abruptly asking them questions while clearly 
armed.215 Taking away passengers in clear sight of others adds 
to the officers’ demonstration of authority and power, which 
would make it difficult for a reasonable person to believe they 
can refuse to answer the officers’ inquiries.216  
Further, to determine whether a police practice violates 
the Fourth Amendment, courts often balance the government 
interest at issue with the private interest in privacy.217 In INS 
v. Delgado and the drug search cases, the public interest in 
favor of curbing illegal immigration or fighting the war on 
drugs, respectively, outweighed the private interest in 
privacy.218 The random document checks conducted on domestic 
buses and trains are justified primarily by the aim of fighting 
terrorism. As demonstrated by changes in immigration law and 
congressional spending after the September 11 attacks, 
fighting terrorism has become a national priority.219 The 
random passenger surveys conducted on domestic vessels are 
an outgrowth of those policy changes. 
  
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. 
 213 See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 211 (2002) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“The officers took control of the entire passenger compartment . . . . The 
reasonable inference was that the ‘interdiction’ was not a consensual exercise . . . .”).  
 214 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 442 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 215 See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 230, 234 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“To say that such an indiscriminate policy of mass interrogation is constitutional 
makes a mockery of the words of the Fourth Amendment.”); see also NYCLU REPORT, 
supra note 9, at 21 (arguing that “when an armed agent questions passengers on a 
train or bus, sometimes in the middle of the night with a flashlight glaring at the 
rider’s face, few individuals would feel that they have the right to refuse to answer the 
agent’s questions”).  
 216 See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 230 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 217 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976) (“In 
delineating the constitutional safeguards applicable in particular contexts, the Court 
has weighed the public interest against the Fourth Amendment interest of the 
individual . . . .” (citations omitted)); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968).  
 218 See supra Part III.A. 
 219 See supra Part I.B and C. 
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Although fighting terrorism is vital, it is questionable 
whether these types of tactics actually work towards that 
goal.220 Most of the arrests that occur as a result of these 
document checks are for immigration, not criminal, violations; 
a minuscule percentage are at all related to terrorism.221 
Fighting terrorism is a critical goal—but it is not accomplished 
by these types of random searches.  
On the other hand, the potential for private harm is 
huge. Individuals who cannot present proper immigration 
documents are removed from the train or bus and taken to 
detention facilities or local prisons for further questioning and 
investigation.222 According to the NYCLU’s Report, the majority 
of individuals who were arrested and detained could not be 
released without posting a bond, which could range from $1500 
to $20,000.223 The Report postulated that as those arrested had 
just been traveling, they likely did not have such large 
amounts of cash on them and probably had to wait several days 
before being released.224 Because the Supreme Court has 
upheld the constitutionality of mandatory detention,225 once 
these individuals have been detained, they likely have few 
legal options that would allow them to be released quickly. 
Further, under the INA’s expedited removal provisions, once 
they are arrested, certain individuals may even face immediate 
deportation without judicial or administrative review of their 
case.226 Finally, the “exclusionary rule,” which holds that 
evidence found in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be 
excluded from actions by the government against an individual, 
does not apply to civil deportation hearings.227 Even if 
  
 220 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.  
 221 See Drost, supra note 116; see also supra Part I.C. 
 222 NYCLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 14-15; see also Bernstein, supra note 8. In 
one case, a woman was detained for three weeks before seeing an immigration judge. Id. 
 223 NYCLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 15. 
 224 Id. 
 225 See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527-28, 531 (2003) (holding that 
Congress can require that individuals be detained during the pendency of their 
removal proceedings); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 543-44 
(1985) (holding that the detention of a suspected alimentary canal smuggler for almost 
sixteen hours before inspectors sought a warrant was not unreasonably long). 
 226 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (2006) for which categories of aliens are subject to 
expedited removal. Expedited removal may occur simply by an order issued by an 
immigration official. Because of the speed with which it occurs, and the lack of 
oversight in the procedure, expedited removal has been heavily criticized as a system 
that lacks necessary due process protections and subjects aliens who are legitimately 
seeking asylum to the caprice of “low-level immigration inspection officers,” whose 
decisions are “unreviewable.” See Gebisa, supra note 62, at 566; see also Wadhia, supra 
note 62, at 392.  
 227 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984). 
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immigration agents act unlawfully, unlike in an ordinary 
criminal trial, any illegal immigrant arrested as a result of an 
illegal search will still be subject to deportation.228 Further, 
many commentators have raised concerns about whether this 
practice amounts to racial profiling.229 Although immigration 
agents assert that they randomly question people and do not 
base suspects on race, at present no limitations ensure that 
racial profiling is not occurring.230 
Therefore, although the justification for these 
transportation checks is, on its face, without fault, the actual 
results have not borne out this justification. Moreover, the risk 
of private harm far outweighs the public utility of this practice. 
Private individuals that are randomly questioned by this 
procedure, if they are noncitizens and not carrying proper 
documentation, may be subjected to detention and 
deportation—and the possible unlawfulness of the procedure 
will not protect them. This is unjust both because many of the 
individuals arrested do have lawful status to be in the United 
States,231 and because many have been here for long periods of 
time and have established ties to the country and the right to 
more constitutional protection than someone entering for the 
first time.232 Congress and the DHS should both institute 
procedures and amendments to ensure that immigration 
officials proceed carefully and are limited in their actions.  
IV. PROPOSAL 
Congress must act to restrict the practice of randomly 
questioning individuals traveling on domestic buses and trains 
  
 228 Id. at 1050-51. This is because an immigration violation is considered an 
ongoing violation, and the Court has argued that,  
Applying the exclusionary rule in proceedings that are intended not to punish 
past transgressions but to prevent their continuance or renewal would 
require the courts to close their eyes to ongoing violations of the law. This 
Court has never before accepted costs of this character in applying the 
exclusionary rule. 
Id. at 1046. 
 229 See NYCLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 7, 16; Bazar, supra note 103. 
 230 See NYCLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 26 (“While CBP has refused to 
release its training materials on racial and ethnic profiling, accounts of its operations 
raise serious concerns that Border Patrol agents resort to racial and ethnic profiling 
techniques to determine who to stop, question or arrest. Such accounts indicate that 
even if CBP policy expressly forbids racial and ethnic profiling, additional guidance 
and training of Border Patrol officers is necessary to ensure appropriate compliance.”) 
 231 Id. at 6-7. 
 232 See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.  
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about their immigration status by amending the INA to define 
the parameters of a permissible stop and inquiry more 
narrowly. The Supreme Court in United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce233 held that beyond the border or its functional 
equivalent, officers in roving patrols can only stop individuals if 
they have reasonable suspicion to believe they are illegal 
aliens.234 This same standard should be applied to the 
transportation checks at issue here. Border Patrol agents must 
have reasonable suspicion to stop and question someone on the 
train or bus about their immigration status.235  
Further, as in Brignoni-Ponce and Terry, the search must 
be limited in scope.236 There is a difference between believing 
that someone is an alien, an illegal alien, or a terrorist.237 If 
immigration agents believe that such transportation checks are 
necessary to stop terrorism and to curb illegal immigration, they 
must have reasonable suspicion—specifically, articulable facts—
to believe that the individual they are questioning is either a 
terrorist or an illegal alien. 
The INA itself provides a model for the framing of this 
amendment. The INA states that immigration officials have 
the authority to “conduct a search, without warrant, of the 
person, and of the personal effects in the possession of any 
person seeking admission to the United States, concerning 
whom such officer or employee may have reasonable cause to 
suspect that grounds exist for denial of admission to the United 
States.”238 The “reasonable cause” limitation should be added to 
the other parts of the statute as well, requiring that officers 
may interrogate individuals suspected of being illegal aliens, or 
board vessels to search for illegal aliens, only if they have 
“reasonable cause” to suspect that the individual is an illegal 
alien or a terrorist. 
Finally, Congress should act pragmatically when enacting 
this amendment by requiring that the DHS train immigration 
officials on determining what constitutes reasonable suspicion 
and when they may question individuals on suspicion that they 
  
 233 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
 234 Id. at 881-82. Specifically, officers must be “aware of specific articulable facts, 
together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that 
the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country.” Id. at 884. 
 235 See NYCLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 25-26. 
 236 See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968) 
(holding that a stop and search inquiry must be “reasonably related in scope to the 
justification for [the] initiation”).  
 237 See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 235 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 238 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c) (2006) (emphasis added). 
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are in the country illegally or are involved in terrorism. In 
particular, this training should address the issue of racial 
profiling to ensure that the officers’ determinations are based on 
more than race.239 This training program can be modeled on the 
USCIS Asylum Division Training Section, a “national training 
course that is specific to asylum adjudicators.”240 Asylum officers 
are required to attend periodic trainings both in national offices 
and in their regional offices that educate them on the relevant 
asylum law, how to properly adjudicate applications, and 
interviewing and writing skills, among other topics.241 Officers are 
also required to attend periodic trainings to update their skills 
and their knowledge of the field.242 
A similar training program can be instituted for Border 
Patrol agents who investigate domestic trains and buses. Like 
the asylum officers, Border Patrol officers can be required to 
learn about Fourth Amendment case law and its proper 
application in the field. Further, officers can learn the proper 
evidentiary standards required to question passengers and the 
factors that may have more relevance to making a decision 
about investigating passengers. Officers can also receive 
training on questioning passengers in less obtrusive ways. 
Although the Border Patrol has recently taken steps to 
curb the practice of searching domestic trains and buses for illegal 
immigrants, and has stated that it will conduct searches only 
when it has information regarding a threat,243 these changes have 
not been codified in any formal agency policy, rule, or law.244 To 
ensure that long-term changes are made to the practice, Congress 
should enact formal changes to the INA, and the DHS should put 
in place ongoing training courses for its Border Patrol agents. 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. When immigration officials, 
with no articulable reason, question passengers traveling on 
domestic train and bus routes about their immigration status, 
they violate this fundamental mandate of the U.S. Constitution. 
  
 239 See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885-87 (stating that an individual’s Mexican 
ancestry, alone, does not provide such facts and is therefore an illegal reason to stop and 
question an individual, although Mexican appearance is a “relevant factor”).  
 240 Asylum Division Training Programs, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?
vgnextoid=2a1d1a877b4bc110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=3a82ef
4c766fd010VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD (last updated Apr. 12, 2011). 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id.  
 243 NBPC Press Release, supra note 34. 
 244 U.S. Relaxes Canadian Border Checks as Agents Are Told to Stop 
Searching Buses, Trains and Planes for Illegal Immigrants, supra note 32. 
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Congress and the DHS must work together to set clearer 
limitations on the practice and to train immigration officials in 
the proper ways to conduct investigations. 
CONCLUSION 
In the years following the September 11 terrorist 
attacks, immigration became linked with terrorist activity in 
the public mind. Congress and the President responded by 
enacting policies to curb illegal immigration with the principal 
aim of fighting terrorism. In particular, they established one 
agency, the DHS, to oversee both immigration and national 
security and made explicit the administration’s view that 
immigration and terrorism were intricately linked. Congress 
also increased funding to the newly-created government 
agencies whose purpose became to secure the national borders 
in order to fight terrorism. 
As a result of these actions, the fear of terrorism and 
terrorists has become a fear of illegal immigration, and the 
overall climate of fighting illegal immigration has led to a 
policy whereby immigration agents board domestic trains and 
buses and freely question all passengers regarding their 
citizenship and immigration status. This practice has been 
justified as a terrorism-fighting measure, but it has not 
resulted in the capture of any terrorists. Instead, agents have 
arrested students and other individuals who have resided in 
the country for years.245 
President Barack Obama has argued that individuals 
who have been in the United States since they were children 
should not be treated in the same way as other illegal 
immigrants.246 He supported passage of the Dream Act, 
legislation that would have enabled individuals that had been 
in the country since childhood and had completed college or 
military service in the United States to become citizens.247 
Though the bill was defeated in the Senate,248 the official 
sanction for such a law demonstrates that not all aliens, who 
may technically be illegal, should be treated alike. 
  
  
 245 Bernstein, supra note 8. 
 246 Herszenhorn, supra note 27.  
 247 Id.  
 248 Id. 
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The random interrogation of passengers traveling on 
domestic routes unjustifiably subjects them to an 
unconstitutional intrusion on their personal privacy. Legislative 
and administrative action must limit this practice in its scope.  
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